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Abstract 
One of the most significant consequences of the use of post-
conviction DNA testing in the criminal justice system has been the 
growing recognition that eyewitness identification testimony is simply 
not as reliable as it was previously considered to be. In approximately 
75% of DNA exonerations in the United States, mistaken eyewitness 
identifications were the principal cause of wrongful convictions. 
Notwithstanding scientific advances regarding human memory and 
other factors that could influence identifications by eyewitnesses, 
courts have not shown eagerness in utilising such scientific 
knowledge in reaching legal decisions. Two cases have been chosen 
for discussion in this article. In S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011) 
the New Jersey Supreme Court was the first in State and Federal 
jurisdictions in the US that adopted a science-based approach to the 
evaluation of eyewitness evidence. The other case under discussion 
is S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA), a South African Supreme 
Court of Appeal judgment, where the identification of the perpetrator 
was based on an eyewitness account and the evidence of an expert 
on CCTV images. In part one of this article the research findings with 
regard to estimator variables that were acknowledged in S v 
Henderson are discussed. Part two specifically scrutinizes S v 
Mdlongwa to determine the extent to which psychological eyewitness 
research findings are recognised in South Africa as having an 
influence on the reliability of eyewitness evidence. In Henderson the 
court recognised that the legal standards governing the admissibility 
and use of identification evidence lagged far behind the findings of 
numerous studies in the social sciences. The new wave introduced by 
S v Henderson has not gone unnoticed in other State courts in the 
USA. In Massachusetts, for example, the Justices of the Supreme 
Judicial Court convened a study group on Eyewitness Evidence and 
the resulting report inter alia recommended judicial notice of modern 
psychological principles, revised jury eyewitness identification 
instructions and continuous education of both judges and lawyers. 
Recognition and education pertaining to these factors can and should 
be incorporated in South Africa.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The frailties of eyewitness evidence 
The identification of the perpetrator is often the only issue that needs to be 
determined in a criminal trial.1 Eyewitness evidence is usually the main type 
of evidence on which convictions are based. One of the most significant 
consequences of the use of post-conviction DNA testing in the criminal 
justice system has been the growing recognition that eyewitness 
identification testimony is simply not as reliable as it was previously 
considered to be. In approximately 75% of DNA exonerations in the United 
States, mistaken eyewitness identifications were the principal cause of 
wrongful convictions.2 The actual impact of the problem is difficult to fathom 
as other offences such as robbery also involve eyewitness testimony but 
usually lack evidence that can be tested for DNA.3 Mistaken convictions of 
the innocent undermine the criminal justice system as a whole, because an 
innocent person is punished for a crime he or she did not commit, while the 
actual perpetrator continues to threaten society by remaining free.4 It would 
be naïve to believe that these difficulties are limited to overseas 
jurisdictions, and that the South African legal system does not face the same 
dilemma. 
1.2 Recognition of scientific research on eyewitness identification 
Psychologists raised doubts regarding the reliability of eyewitness accounts 
long before DNA testing became a reality. In the first part of the twentieth 
century, Hugo Münsterberg5 argued that the insights of psychology could 
assist legal decision making in cases where eyewitness statements have to 
be evaluated.6 However, it was only after the mid-1970s7 that psychologists 
started systematic experimental work regarding the margins of error and the 
variables involved in testimony presented by witnesses who had observed 
a crime. Throughout the last thirty years a considerable body of research 
has developed in the field of eyewitness identification.8 Social science 
research indicates a variety of causes of eyewitness misidentification. The 
scientific eyewitness identification literature tends to rely on a distinction 
                                            
1  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA). 
2  Monroe 2013 http://bit.ly/1TwThG0. 
3  Findley "Wrongful Conviction." 
4  Wyss Visual Identification 2. 
5  Münsterberg On the Witness Stand. 
6  Wells, Memon and Penrod 2006 Psychol Sci Public Interest 45. 
7  Wells, Memon and Penrod 2006 Psychol Sci Public Interest 45. 
8  Shell 2013 Suffolk U L Rev 263. 
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between estimator variables and system variables.9 Estimator variables are 
those that affect the accuracy of eyewitness identifications, but cannot be 
controlled by the criminal justice system.10 System variables also affect the 
accuracy of eyewitness identifications, but the criminal justice system can 
control those variables.11 Estimator variables tend to have to do with 
situational factors involved in the acquisition phase, such as lighting 
conditions, distance, arousal, the presence of weapons, et cetera that 
cannot be addressed by systemic reform.12  
However, notwithstanding scientific advances regarding human memory 
and other factors that could influence identifications by eyewitnesses, courts 
have not shown eagerness in utilising such scientific knowledge in reaching 
legal decisions.13 In some instances courts have grasped the effect that 
some variables have on decision-making14 and at other times decision 
makers have neglected to take note of research results that can assist the 
trier of fact in evaluating eyewitness evidence.15  
1.3  A comparative view 
The question of how to incorporate the scientific findings into judicial 
decision-making in order to prevent some of the major problems attached 
to eyewitness evidence has been enduring.16 In some states in the United 
States of America (USA), expert evidence has been allowed to educate the 
jury, but courts have resisted this approach as it is an expensive and time-
consuming method to manage the problem.17 In South Africa expert 
evidence on the frailties of eyewitness evidence is unlikely to be admitted 
on the basis that the modalities of eyewitness evidence are regarded as 
common sense which lies within the knowledge of the presiding officer. 
Moreover, in respect of eyewitness testimony it is frequently believed that 
any unreliability can be exposed by cross-examination.18 What this view 
does not consider is that some factors bearing on the reliability of 
                                            
9  Wells 1978 J Pers Soc Psychol 1548. 
10  Wells 1978 J Pers Soc Psychol 1548-1552. 
11  Wells 1978 J Pers Soc Psychol 1552. 
12  Wells 1978 J Pers Soc Psychol 1552-1555. 
13  Harris Failed Evidence; Meintjes-Van der Walt 2009 SACJ 305-326. 
14  R v Masemang 1950 2 SA 488 (A) 493: "The often patent honesty, sincerity and 
conviction of an identifying witness remains, however, a snare to the judicial officer 
who does not constantly remind himself of the necessity of dissipating any danger of 
error in such evidence." 
15  Meintjes-Van der Walt 2009 SACJ 305-326. 
16  Meintjes-Van der Walt 2009 SACJ 305-326. 
17  See Penrod and Cutler 1995 Behav Sci & L 229, 230; Leippe 1995 Psychol Pub Pol'y 
& L 909. 
18  Epstein 2007 Stetson L Rev 727, 772. 
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eyewitness identification may be contrary to the intuitive beliefs of most 
people, and that cross-examination is not sufficient a tool to expose identity 
errors made by an honest but mistaken witness. 
Two cases have been chosen for discussion and analysis below. In S v 
Henderson,19 the New Jersey Supreme Court was the first in State and 
Federal jurisdictions in the US that adopted a science-based approach to 
the evaluation of eyewitness evidence. The other case under discussion is 
S v Mdlongwa,20 a South African Supreme Court of Appeal judgment, where 
the identification of the perpetrator was based on an eyewitness account 
and the evidence of an expert on CCTV images.21 This case is used as a 
barometer to measure the extent to which estimator variable factors could 
influence eyewitness identification in South Africa. It is not contended that 
the decision in S v Mdlongwa was necessarily incorrect, but the Mdlongwa22 
judgment is used to reflect the differences between the two cases in respect 
of eyewitness testimony and the recognition of eyewitness science. 
In part one of this article the research findings with regard to estimator 
variables23 that were acknowledged in S v Henderson are discussed. Part 
two specifically scrutinises the South African Supreme Court of Appeal 
judgment in S v Mdlongwa24 to determine the extent to which psychological 
eyewitness research findings are recognised in South Africa as having an 
influence on the reliability of eyewitness evidence.  
2 S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011)25  
2.1 The background In S v Henderson26 New Jersey's highest court 
unanimously revisited its thirty-four-year-old legal standard as applied in the 
                                            
19  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
20  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA). 
21  Edmond and Meintjes-Van der Walt 2014 SALJ 109-148. 
22  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA). 
23  The Henderson decision also concentrated on research that focussed on system 
variables, but because these variables are not relevant in the Mdlongwa case this 
discussion deals only with estimator variables. 
24  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA). 
25  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
26  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
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Manson27/Madison28 test in evaluating eyewitness identification evidence. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court undertook a thorough and comprehensive 
survey of the current scientific and legal state of eyewitness identification. 
This survey grew out of a court-ordered hearing on eyewitness identification 
conducted by a court-appointed Special Master, retired judge Gaulkin,29 
who heard testimony by seven experts that ultimately "produced more than 
2,000 pages of transcripts along with hundreds of scientific studies".30 
These studies presented at the hearing, and ultimately relied upon by the 
court, are based on serious and verifiable science.31 The Special Master 
found that out of 64 cognitive psychologists, social psychologists and other 
experts surveyed,32 "[n]inety percent or more" found research on 
                                            
27  Manson v Brathwaite 432 US 98 (1977). In terms of Manson, a defendant must show 
that suggestive police procedures were used during an eyewitness identification to 
obtain a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of the evidence. If the court determines 
the procedures are not "impermissibly suggestive", then the trial judge will admit the 
eyewitness evidence without considering any other variables that might bear on the 
reliability of the identification. Where the identification is questionable, the remedy 
under Manson is to suppress the evidence as a whole. This, however, is seldom done 
in practice. 
28  S v Madison 109 NJ 223, 536 A 2d 254 (1988). The second prong of the so-called 
Manson/Madison test requires consideration of five factors: (1) the opportunity of the 
witness to view the suspect at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of 
attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the suspect; (4) the level 
of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation; and (5) the time between the crime and 
the confrontation. 
29  A "special master" is "a representative of the court appointed to hear a case involving 
difficult or specialized issues". (FARLEX 2014 http://bit.ly/1XfviB3) 
30  Supreme Court of New Jersey 2008 http://bit.ly/1VP6ikK (hereafter "Report of the 
Special Master). 
31  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). "The research [relied upon by the court] 
represents the gold standard in terms of the applicability of social science research to 
law. Experimental methods and findings have been tested and retested, subjected to 
scientific scrutiny through peer-reviewed journals, evaluated through the lens of meta-
analyses, and replicated at times in real-world settings." (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
32  Report of the Special Master 26: "Ninety-two percent of the participating experts had 
published articles or books on eyewitness identification, and many in the group had 
testified as expert witnesses in almost 1,000 court cases, collectively." (citation 
omitted). 
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eyewitness identification reliable.33 
Based on the fact that judicial precedent and research findings are at 
variance, the court held that "[v]irtually all of the scientific evidence"34 that 
had emerged in recent decades "reveals that an array of variables can affect 
and dilute memory and lead to misidentifications".35  
2.2 The facts 
Henderson was prosecuted for homicide and was inter alia convicted of 
reckless manslaughter. He claimed that he had been misidentified by an 
eyewitness, W, who was present in the apartment of the deceased when 
two armed men forcibly entered. One of the men, who was a stranger to W, 
held W at gunpoint while the other, who was known to W, shot the 
deceased. Two weeks later, W attended a photo display line-up conducted 
by a detective who was not engaged in the investigation. However, when W 
was unable to make an identification two of the case detectives intervened. 
This was in breach of the Attorney-General's Guidelines for Preparing and 
Conducting Photo and Live Line-up Identification Procedures.  
According to the approach used in the Henderson case, a trial court may, 
at a pretrial hearing, apply its mind to factors which could have impacted on 
the reliability of an eyewitness' identification, provided that a defendant can 
present evidence of a system variable which might have allowed prompting 
or suggestion at an eyewitness identification event. The eyewitness 
evidence will be suppressed by the trial judge if the defendant can prove "a 
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification".36  
The increase in attention devoted to the science of eyewitness identification 
has resulted in a better understanding of how human memory works. 
Understanding how memory works has, in turn, given rise to substantial 
concerns regarding the ability of eyewitnesses to make accurate 
identifications from memory.37 Memory 
                                            
33  Report of the Special Master 26: "Ninety percent or more of the experts found research 
on the following topics reliable: suggestive wording; lineup instruction bias; confidence 
malleability; mugshot bias; post-event information; child suggestivity; alcohol 
intoxication; and own-race bias. Seventy to 87% found the following research reliable: 
weapon focus; the accuracy confidence relationship; memory decay; exposure times; 
sequential presentation; show-ups; description-matched foils; child-witness accuracy; 
and lineup fairness." (citations omitted). 
34  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011); Report of the Special Master 12. 
35  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011); Report of the Special Master 3. 
36  Manson v Brathwaite 432 US 98 (1977); S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 NJ (2011). 
37  Report of the Special Master 14-15. 
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consists of three stages: acquisition – "the perception of the original event"; 
retention – "the period of time that passes between the event and the eventual 
recollection of a particular piece of information"; and retrieval – the "stage 
during which a person recalls stored information".38 
At each of those stages the "information ultimately offered as 'memory' can 
be distorted, contaminated and even falsely imagined".39 The court did not 
attempt to list all of the factors that can result in distortion, contamination, or 
false memory, but indicated that scientists have isolated many of the factors 
that can result in a misidentification by an eyewitness.40 As stated above, 
some of those factors, called "system variables" 41 "are within the control of 
the criminal justice system", while "estimator variables"42 cannot be 
addressed by reforming the system. 
The court considered the research and Special Master's findings on 
estimator variables and held that the following estimator variables should 
be taken into consideration in determining the reliability of eyewitness 
evidence. 
2.3 Estimator variables that have an effect on the reliability of 
eyewitness evidence 
2.3.1 Stress 
High stress levels drastically reduce the accuracy of eyewitness memory.43 
The court found that individuals tend to recall information best under 
conditions of moderate stress or arousal.44 Based on the report of the 
Special Master, the court confirmed the negative correlation between stress 
and the accuracy of eyewitness recall. That is, the more stress undergone 
by a witness at the time of an event, the lower her ability to recall the details 
of that event — including the identity of the perpetrator. 
                                            
38  Report of the Special Master 14. 
39  Report of the Special Master 14. 
40  Report of the Special Master 8-26. 
41  System variables include the following: blind administration, pre-identification 
instructions, lineup construction, avoiding feedback and recording confidence, multiple 
viewings, simultaneous versus sequential lineups, composites, and show ups. Report 
of the Special Master 15-20. 
42  Estimator variables include the following: stress, weapon focus, duration, distance and 
lighting, witness characteristics, characteristics of the perpetrator, memory decay, 
race bias, private actors, and speed of identification. Report of the Special Master 20-
25. 
43  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
44  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
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The example used to illustrate this correlation is based on the 2004 study 
by Charles Morgan.45 The researchers used a military "survival training" 
scenario to test the correlation between stress and the accuracy of recall. 
The test subjects were active-duty military personnel with an average age 
of 25 and an average length of service of 4 years. 
Each person was subjected to both stressful and non-stressful interrogation 
and afterwards various methods were used to test the subjects' ability to 
identify the person who had performed the interrogation. The stressful 
scenario involved interrogation for a period of forty minutes in a brightly lit 
room while the interrogator faced the subject. A mere 34 per cent of the 
subjects could correctly identify the interrogator. In a similar scenario which 
involved low stress, 76 per cent of the subjects could identify the interrogator 
from a photo lineup. In a different sample, 68 per cent of the subjects 
exposed to high stress selected a person other than the real interrogator 
from the photographs provided, while only 12 per cent of the subjects 
involved in the low stress experiment chose the wrong person.46 
The experiment outlined above, which was referred to by the court, clearly 
indicates how stress can affect eyewitness recall. The findings of this 
experiment strongly indicate that courts which consider gun shots and 
homicidal threats as "events that tend to focus a witnesses' [sic] attention"47 
could misdirect themselves as the scientific evidence suggests that these 
kinds of stressful events could make recall difficult. 
The factors outlined above could result in misidentifications. Every 
misidentification could potentially result in the decision- maker finding an 
innocent person guilty. 
The Henderson court found that high levels of stress are likely to affect the 
reliability of a witness' identification but that there is no precise measure of 
"high stress" and it must be assessed in individual cases.48 The prosecution 
agreed that high levels of stress are more likely than low levels to impair 
identification. Scientific research affirms that conclusion. A meta-analysis of 
63 studies showed "considerable support for the hypothesis that high levels 
                                            
45  Morgan et al 2004 Int'l J L & Psychiatry 265. 
46  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
47  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
48  Report of the Special Master 43: "The scientific literature reports that, while moderate 
levels of stress improve cognitive processing and might improve accuracy … an 
eyewitness under high stress is less likely to make a reliable identification of the 
perpetrator." 
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of stress negatively impact both accuracy of eyewitness identification as 
well as accuracy of recall of crime-related details".49  
2.3.2 Weapon focus 
Weapon focus refers to a factor that affects the reliability of eyewitness 
testimony.50 Where a weapon is used during a crime, the weapon is likely 
to divert the witness's attention to the weapon that the perpetrator is holding 
and this affects the ability of the witness to concentrate on the details of the 
crime.51 The visual attention given by a witness to a weapon can impair his 
or her ability to make a reliable identification and describe what the culprit 
looks like if the crime is of short duration.52 
The focused attention that an eyewitness pays to the weapon that the 
perpetrator holds during the commission of the alleged crime forms the 
basis of this concept. The proponents of this view believe that all the visual 
attention of the eyewitness gets drawn to the weapon, thereby affecting the 
ability of the eyewitness to observe other details. Chief Justice Rabner 
acknowledged the results of a meta-analysis undertaken by Nancy 
Steblay53 on this topic. In this meta-analysis, data from various studies on 
this subject was collected and analyzed to determine if the presence of a 
weapon may actually be a factor affecting the memory or perception of an 
eyewitness to a real crime. Of the 19 weapon-focus studies that involved 
more than 2,000 identifications, Steblay found an average decrease in 
accuracy of about 10 per cent when a weapon was present. In a separate 
study, half of the witnesses observed a person holding a syringe in a way 
that was personally threatening to the witness; the other half saw the same 
person holding a pen.54 Sixty-four per cent of the witnesses from the first 
group misidentified a filler from a target-absent lineup, compared to thirty-
three from the second group.55 Weapon focus can also affect a witness's 
ability to describe a perpetrator. A meta-analysis of ten studies showed that 
                                            
49  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). The court referred to Deffenbacher et al 2004 
Law & Hum Behav 687-708. This approach was also followed in S v Lawson 352 Or 
724 (2012) 771-772 and S v Guilbert 306 Conn 218 (2012) 253. 
50  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
51  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
52  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
53  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). Rabner J refers to Steblay 1992 Law & Hum 
Behav 413, 415-417 
54  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). The court referred to Maass & Köhnken 1989 
Law & Hum Behav 397, 401-402. 
55  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). The court also referred to Pickel "Remembering 
and Identifying Menacing Perpetrators" 339, 353-354 (noting that "unusual items [like 
weapons]" attract attention). 
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"weapon-absent condition[s] generated significantly more accurate 
descriptions of the perpetrator than did the weapon-present condition".56 
Thus, especially when the interaction is brief, the presence of a visible 
weapon can affect the reliability of an identification and the accuracy of a 
witness's description of the perpetrator. 
2.3.3 Duration 
The length of time an eyewitness observes an event may affect reliability.57 
The Henderson court accepted the finding of the Special Master that "while 
there is no minimum time required to make an accurate identification, a brief 
or fleeting contact is less likely to produce an accurate identification than a 
more prolonged exposure".58 
Judge Rabner held: 
There is no measure to determine exactly how long a view is needed to be 
able to make a reliable identification. Dr Malpass testified that very brief but 
good views can produce accurate identifications, and Dr Wells suggested that 
the quality of a witness' memory may have as much to do with the absence of 
other distractions as with duration. Whatever the threshold, studies have 
shown, and the Special Master found, 'that witnesses consistently tend to 
overestimate short durations, particularly where much was going on or the 
event was particularly stressful.59 
2.3.4 Distance and lighting 
Greater distance and poor lighting can lessen reliability.60 It is obvious that 
it is easier to recognise a person when that person is close by, and that 
clarity decreases with distance.61 Poor lighting makes it harder to see well.62 
Therefore a greater distance between a witness and a perpetrator and poor 
lighting conditions can reduce the reliability of an identification.63 Further 
research by scientists has provided additional evidence of these common-
sense notions.64 
                                            
56  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). The court referred to Steblay 1992 Law & Hum 
Behav 417. 
57  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
58  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). The court referred to research by Tredoux 
"Eyewitness Identification" 875, 877. 
59  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). The view of the Special Master that was 
accepted by the court is based on Loftus et al 1987 Appl Cogn Psychol 10. 
60  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
61  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
62  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
63  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
64  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). The court referred to research by Lindsay et 
al 2008 Law & Hum Behav 526. 
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2.3.5 Witness characteristics 
Judge Rabner recognised that characteristics like age and the level of 
intoxication can affect the reliability of eyewitness testimony. The court 
referred to the findings of the Special Master based on the work of Dysart 
et al,65 which indicates that "the effects of alcohol on identification accuracy 
show that high levels of alcohol promote false identifications" and that "low 
alcohol intake produces fewer misidentifications than high alcohol intake".66 
The court also based its judgment on work done by Pozzulo and Lindsay,67 
according to which factors such as a witness's age and level of intoxication 
can affect the reliability of an identification. Other research also shows that 
witness accuracy declines with age. This was shown across twelve studies. 
Young witnesses – ranging from nineteen to twenty-four years old – were 
more accurate when viewing target-absent lineups than older witnesses – 
ranging from sixty-eight to seventy-four years old.68 Research is, however, 
inconclusive on specific age as a factor in the reliability of identifications.69 
2.3.6 Characteristics of the perpetrator 
Disguises and changes in facial features can affect a witness's ability to 
remember and identify a perpetrator. The Special Master found that 
"[d]isguises (e.g hats, sunglasses, masks) are confounding to witnesses 
and reduce the accuracy of identifications".70 According to the State, those 
findings are "so well-known that criminals employ them in their work".71 
Disguises as simple as hats have been shown to reduce identification 
accuracy.72 If facial features are altered between the time of the event and 
the identification procedure – if, for example, the culprit grows a beard – the 
accuracy of an identification may decrease.73  
  
                                            
65  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). The court referred to Dysart et al 2002 J Appl 
Psychol 170. 
66  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
67  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). Pozzulo and Lindsay 1996 Law & Hum Behav 
549. 
68  Pozzulo and Lindsay 1996 Law & Hum Behav 549. S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 
2011). 
69  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
70  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
71  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
72  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). Reference is made to Cutler et al 1987 J Appl 
Psychol 629, 635. 
73  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). The court referred to Patterson and Baddeley 
1977 J Exp Psychol Hum Learn Mem 406, 410, 414. 
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2.3.7 Memory decay 
The length of time between an incident and an identification, referred to as 
the "retention interval", affects the accuracy of eyewitness identifications.74 
Memories fade with time; thus there is a greater possibility that a witness' 
memory of the perpetrator will weaken as time passes. The court accepted 
the Special Master's observation that memory decay "is irreversible" – 
memories never improve.75 As a result, delays between the commission of 
a crime and the time an identification is made can affect reliability. This basic 
principle was held not to be in dispute. 
A meta-analysis by Deffenbacher76 of fifty-three "facial memory studies" 
confirmed "that memory strength will be weaker at longer retention intervals 
than at briefer ones". The court concluded that the more time that passes, 
the greater the possibility that a witness' memory of a perpetrator will 
weaken.77 
2.3.8 Race-bias 
The court previously recognised that a witness may have more difficulty 
making a cross-racial identification and it continues to be a factor that can 
affect reliability.78 
2.4 Commentary 
The foregoing factors produce varying but significant rates of 
misidentifications. Each time a misidentification occurs, there is a strong 
possibility that a jury will find an innocent person guilty. The Supreme Court 
of New Jersey elaborated and held that:  
study after study revealed a troubling lack of reliability in eyewitness 
identifications. From social science research to the review of actual police 
lineups, from laboratory experiments to DNA exonerations, the record proves 
that the possibility of mistaken identification is real. Indeed, it is now widely 
known that eyewitness misidentification is the leading cause of wrongful 
convictions across the country.79 
Realising that the legal framework at that time failed to adequately protect 
defendants against misidentifications, the New Jersey court changed its 
                                            
74  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
75  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
76  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). The court referred to the research of 
Deffenbacher et al 2004 Law & Hum Behav 687, 699. 
77  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
78  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
79  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
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treatment of eyewitness identification. The court now allows pretrial 
hearings for accused persons who can show some evidence that 
suggestion occurred during the identification.80 At the pretrial hearing, the 
court will investigate all relevant factors that might "affect reliability in 
deciding whether an identification is admissible".81 On request of the court 
the New Jersey's Criminal Practice Committee drafted revised jury 
instructions relating to eyewitness identification and the factors that can lead 
to misidentifications.82 These instructions83 are considered in the conclusion 
below. 
Although the Henderson decision currently affects only the standard for the 
admissibility of eyewitness identification in New Jersey, the insight of the 
court in acknowledging eyewitness science represents a great step forward 
in the recognition of how scientific research can inform legal decision-
making. The section that follows below evaluates the South African 
Supreme Court of Appeal's approach84 to eyewitness evidence as 
compared to S v Henderson. 
3 S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) 
3.1 Introduction 
In S v Ngcobo85 Didcott J took judicial notice of Eyewitness Testimony by 
Elizabeth Loftus86 in stating that: 
[t]he danger of mistaken identification is one to which all judicial officers are 
or should certainly be alive. Enough has been said about it over the years, 
and in various parts of the world to see to that.87 
This approach by Didcott J was criticised in that this was not a fact that 
judicial notice could be taken of.88 Unlike some expert evidence such as 
Battered Woman's Syndrome,89 South African courts have not been willing 
to hear expert evidence on the limitations of eyewitness testimony as it is 
considered to be within the common knowledge of judicial decision makers. 
                                            
80  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
81  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
82  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
83  Criminal Practice Committee 2012 http://bit.ly/21KZq7R. 
84  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA). 
85  S v Ngobo 1986 1 SA 905 (N). 
86  Loftus Eyewitness Testimony. 
87  Loftus Eyewitness Testimony 906. 
88  Skeen 1987 SALJ 297. 
89  Holtzhausen v Roodt 1997 4 SA 766 (WLD); S v Engelbrecht. 2005 2 SACR 41 (W). 
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3.2 The facts 
On 11 February 2004 five men entered the NBS Building Society in Dundee, 
KwaZulu-Natal, and robbed the bank of R50 000. This event is reflected in 
a number of still images taken from nine CCTV cameras placed in the bank. 
The images taken from the video inter alia showed a person standing next 
to the security guard and another person wearing a blue Adidas T-shirt and 
blue Adidas shorts who entered the glass offices of the bank. On 26 
September 2005, five men were prosecuted in the Regional Court, Dundee, 
for armed robbery. The appellant, who was accused four, as well as 
accused five, were found guilty on this charge and sentenced to 20 years' 
imprisonment. 
The State's case was based on a dock identification of accused four and 
accused five and facial comparison evidence by a police expert, N. For the 
purposes of comparison, the witness used a still image from the CCTV 
footage, Exhibit 29, and compared that with a photograph marked as Exhibit 
K. She asserted that Exhibit K90 and Exhibit 29 depicted the same person 
and that that person was the appellant (accused four). She was unable to 
identify accused four in court. The appellant pleaded not guilty, denied that 
he participated in the robbery and stated that he was elsewhere on the day 
in question, but also that he was not the person depicted in the photograph, 
Exhibit K. The person identified by N as accused four in the still image taken 
from the CCTV footage was a person wearing a blue Adidas T-shirt and 
blue shorts from the same brand (Exhibit 29). The security guard, Mbatha, 
however, testified that it was accused five wearing the Adidas outfit. No 
identification parade was held. The appellant was legally represented and 
elected not to testify. 
3.3 The Appeal and SCA judgment 
The appellant appealed against the judgment of the magistrate to the High 
Court of Kwazulu-Natal and judgment was given on 26 February 2009.91 
Swain J (Radebe J concurring) dismissed this appeal, finding Mbatha an 
"excellent witness" and his identification reliable on the basis that the 
appellant "was always next to me carrying the firearm".92 The court also 
referred to the evidence of N and noted that photograph F30 taken from the 
video footage in the "Standard Bank" (sic)93 and Exhibit L portrayed the 
                                            
90  Showing a person wearing blue Adidas clothing. 
91  Trial transcript 571-574. Record of appeal Vol 7. 
92  Trial transcript 572. Record of appeal Vol 7. 
93  The robbery took place at the NBS Building Society. 
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appellant.94 Consequently the appeal was dismissed. The appellant then 
made a further application for leave to appeal before Judge Swain. The 
appellant argued his own application as he had exhausted his right to legal 
aid representation.95 Swain J engaged the appellant and showed him 
photograph F30 stating that "I can even see that that is you in the photo".96 
After a lengthy exchange between the judge and the appellant the 
prosecutor interceded indicating that the comparison photograph should be 
Exhibit K and not L and that Exhibit K should have been compared with the 
video footage still, Exhibit 29.97 The appellant maintained that neither 
photograph K nor L was a photograph of him. As a result of the confusion, 
Swain J (Gorven J) granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
In the Supreme Court of Appeal, the appellant, Mdlongwa, challenged his 
conviction on the following grounds: a) that the testimony of the security 
officer, Mbatha, who had been positioned outside the bank was 
"unsatisfactory and contradictory"98 and that no weight should be attached 
to his dock identification of the appellant;99 b) that Inspector N, the facial 
comparison expert called by the prosecution, was no "expert" as she lacked 
academic qualifications and that her conclusions were not acceptable as "it 
was not of a generally accepted standard"100 and c) that the video footage 
of the robbery was not admissible as it was not the original.101 
At the outset of the judgment Salduker AJA, writing for the unanimous court, 
explicitly states that the "sole issues for the determination on appeal is 
whether the appellant was properly identified as one of the robbers".102 
                                            
94  Trial transcript 573. Record of appeal Vol 7. The judge went further and stated that 
"[i]n my view these two photos that form the subject matter of Inspector N's analysis, 
there is a striking similarity between these two individuals. The similarity is so striking 
that I am satisfied that the same individual is depicted" (573). During address from the 
legal representative of the appellant, the judge invites counsel to look at the 
photographs and to give an opinion on whether the person depicted in the 
photographs and the appellant is not one and the same person. This is conceded by 
counsel (569). 
95  Trial transcript 584-600. Record of appeal Vol 7. 
96  Trial transcript 586. Record of Appeal Vol 7. 
97  Trial transcript 593-595. Record of Appeal Vol 7. 
98  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA). 
99  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA). 
100  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA). The inherent unreliability of the facial 
comparison evidence is discussed in another article: Edmond and Meintjes-Van der 
Walt 2014 SALJ. 
101  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA). 
102  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) para 5. 
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The court acknowledged that the only direct evidence of identification of the 
appellant was a dock identification by the security guard, Mbatha.103 He 
testified that accused five was wearing a blue T-shirt, yet according to the 
video stills, it is the person identified by the facial comparison expert as the 
appellant104 (my emphasis) who was wearing the blue T-shirt.105 It was also 
found that Mbatha's identification of the appellant was "corroborated" by the 
facial mapping identification of the appellant by the expert witness. 
In the light of the above, there are certain issues in the judgment that need 
closer examination. 
3.4 Eyewitness identification 
The SCA quite correctly indicated that the only direct evidence of 
identification of the appellant was the dock identification by the security 
guard, Mbatha,106 on 26 September 2006, 19 months after the incident. The 
first ground of appeal was that Mbatha's evidence was unsatisfactory and 
contradictory, and that no reliance could be placed on his dock identification. 
Mbatha's evidence of identification of the appellant was in respect of what 
he observed during the robbery at the bank and his subsequent dock 
identification. No identification parade was held. The court found that 
"[a]ccording to Mbatha's testimony, accused five wore a blue T-shirt, and 
that the appellant stood next to him [Mbatha] carrying a firearm".107 
Mbatha's evidence was that on 11 February 2004 he was on duty outside 
the bank108. He testified that two people approached him.109 He described 
one as having a short haircut and the other as wearing blue Adidas shorts 
and an Adidas T-shirt.110 During his entire testimony this was the only 
description that Mbatha could give of these two persons whom he identified 
as accused four (the appellant) and accused five. He mentioned no facial 
characteristics or other identifying marks. He maintained that the reason for 
him being able to identify accused four and five was the fact that they spoke 
to him. 
                                            
103  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419. 
104  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA). 
105  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) para 9. 
106  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) para 24. 
107  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) para 9. 
108  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) para 6. 
109  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA). 
110  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA). 
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He testified that while they were speaking to him a third person was standing 
at a lotto machine which was on the opposite side to where the bank is 
situated.111 One of two men who initially approached him drew a firearm and 
ordered the witness (the security guard) to allow them as well as the person 
who stood at the lotto machine and two others to enter.112 His evidence was 
that during the entire incident the person who had the firearm and who 
entered with him and remained with him was accused four, the appellant. 
He then relates the mayhem that occurred during the robbery: He noticed 
that there were two who entered the kitchen area and then proceeded to the 
enquiries section, where one of them hit Mr Mabaso, the enquiries clerk, 
with a crowbar and demanded that he open the door.113 He testified that the 
person who assaulted Mr Mabaso wore short pants and a blue T-shirt. 
According to his testimony the robbery took approximately ten minutes.114 
Yet according to the actual time as reflected by the CCTV cameras, the 
robbery took two minutes and ten seconds.115 The person who was with him 
and who was armed with the firearm pointed the firearm at Ayesha Ishmael, 
one of the tellers who was behind the glass on the other side and shouted 
"open, open, open".116 Ayesha then opened the door leading to the tellers' 
section, which was entered.117 According to him, they opened the shelves 
and one went to the manager's office, but what transpired there he could 
not see.118 Mbatha conceded that he was scared, and "shocked". 
According to him he saw two firearms, one held by the person who was with 
him and the other one by the person who pointed the firearm at Mr 
Mabaso.119 He said that the person who was with him had hair that was cut 
short and that the one who had the crowbar and who hit Mr Mabaso was 
one of the two people who entered first. The latter wore short pants and a 
blue T-shirt and was the one who hit Mr Mabaso with the crowbar.120 
  
                                            
111  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) para 6. 
112  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) para 7. 
113  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) para 7. Trial transcript 72. Record of Appeal 
Vol 1. 
114  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA). Trial transcript 91. Record of Appeal Vol 1. 
115  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA). Trial transcript 216-217. Record of Appeal 
Vol 1. See the evidence by Viljoen at 422-423. 
116  Trial transcript 74. Record of Appeal Vol 1. 
117  Trial transcript 75-76. Record of Appeal Vol 1. 
118  Trial transcript 92 and 96. Record of Appeal Vol 1. 
119  Trial transcript 216-217. Record of Appeal Vol 1. 
120  Trial transcript 217. Record of Appeal Vol 1. 
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3.5  Commentary 
The court had to consider not only whether, considering all the evidence, it 
could be said that the State had proven each and every element of the 
offence charged beyond reasonable doubt, but also whether the State had 
proven beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant who committed 
the robbery. 
3.5.1  Caution and corroboration 
In South Africa a cautionary rule to guard against eyewitness mistakes was 
recognised as early as S v Mokoena:121 
[T]he uncorroborated evidence of a single competent and credible witness is 
no doubt declared to be sufficient for a conviction… but in my opinion that 
[witness] should only be relied on where the evidence of the single witness is 
clear and satisfactory in every material respect.122 
In R v Mputing,123 Boshoff J mentioned the following factors that can affect 
the observation of the accused person(s): i) the ability of the witness to 
observe ii) the impression that the observation had on the observer; iii) the 
time lapse after such observation; iv) the ability of the observer to distinguish 
between what he/she actually remembers and what he or she infers from 
the observation made. 
Despite the general consensus about the fragility of eyewitness evidence, 
as recognised in South African law,124 neither the Regional Court judgment, 
the High Court judgment nor the Appeal Court judgment mentioned that 
such evidence should be approached with caution. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal did, however, indicate that some of the evidence was 
"corroborated".125 These apparent corroborations are discussed below.  
Mbatha's testimony was that accused four (the appellant) was not wearing 
the blue Adidas shorts and T-shirt. The court concedes that there is a stark 
contradiction between the evidence of Mbatha and the evidence of the facial 
comparison expert's identification, which asserted that it was the appellant 
who was wearing the blue Adidas clothing.126 The court then argues that 
                                            
121  R v Mokoena 1932 OPD 79. 
122  R v Mokoena 1932 OPD 79, 80. 
123  R v Mputing 1960 1 SA 785 (T). 
124  S v Mthetwa 1972 3 SA 766 (A). 
125  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) paras 9 and 11. 
126  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA).  
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[i]f one examines Mbatha's evidence, except for the description of the clothing 
worn by two of the robbers, whom he identified as the appellant and accused 
five, his testimony is completely in line with what is portrayed on the video 
footage and the stills as having taken place during the robbery.127 
As it cannot be said that the appellant was wearing the blue Adidas clothing, 
it is difficult to follow the court's argument. Mbatha's identification rests 
solely on the clothing that accused five was wearing and the hairstyle of the 
appellant. However, as the court conceded, this is in complete contradiction 
to the video stills. From this it should follow that the dock identification by 
Mbatha and the expert identification of Inspector N are diametrically 
different. The difference is so great and contradictory that this should have 
been the end of the matter and the appellant should have been acquitted. 
In my view there was no way in which this contradiction, which goes to the 
heart of the matter, could be rationalised. However, Salduker AJA then 
asserts that Mbatha's contradictory evidence "should not be seen in 
isolation",128 as Mbatha's evidence that one of the robbers wore a blue T-
shirt was corroborated by Ms Botes, a branch manager at the NBS bank. 
She testified that she was seated in her office when she was confronted by 
one of the robbers wearing a blue T-shirt with an inscription in white with a 
capital letter "A", and that he ordered her to open the safe.129 This so-called 
corroboration as conceded by the court merely corroborates that one of the 
robbers was wearing those clothes and therefore it does not corroborate the 
identification of the appellant (my emphasis).  
The following sentence in the judgment also requires comment: 
Although there were contradictions in his [Mbatha's] testimony as to the 
clothing worn by the appellant and accused five, and his statement to the 
police, when his evidence is assessed as a whole these contradictions are not 
material and pale into insignificance.130 
The contradictions are serious. They cannot be ignored, yet the court does 
not believe that these contradictions are material and significant. The court 
does not give any reasons why little value should be attached to the 
contradictions except to state that when his evidence is "assessed as a 
whole", these contradictions are not significant. However, there is no other 
evidence emanating from him that could justify this view of the court. The 
only evidence given by him on the factum probandum (the identification of 
                                            
127  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) para 9. 
128  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) para 9.  
129  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) para 9. 
130  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) para 11. 
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the appellant) is that which is contradictory to the other evidence proffered 
by the State. 
Mbatha's evidence identifying the appellant as the person next to him is 
supported by the CCTV footage as the stills show a person standing next to 
him with a light blue shirt with rolled up sleeves.131 The video images also 
show another person dressed in Adidas clothing, who is seen entering the 
bank offices. This is the person he identifies as accused five. It cannot 
therefore be said that the video stills also corroborate the identification of 
the appellant by Inspector N, as the person she identified is the person who 
was wearing the Adidas clothes. 
3.5.2  Memory decay 
As pointed out in Henderson above, memories fade with time. The longer 
the intervening period of time, the greater the risk of error. The fact that 19 
months had passed between the robbery and the evidence given by 
Mbatha, does not appear to have been factored into the evaluation of his 
evidence. 
3.5.3  Stress and weapon focus 
It is conceded in Mdlongwa that the circumstances in which the eyewitness, 
Mbatha, found himself were extremely stressful, which stress could have 
impacted on his ability to encode what was happening, and therefore it could 
well have been harder for him to identify the appellant. 
During the robbery Mbatha was confronted not with only one firearm, but 
according to the Court, with two firearms as well as with a crowbar that was 
used to attack the teller, Mabaso. The presence of a visible weapon may 
reduce the reliability of the identification, especially if the crime is of short 
duration. Another statement of the court requires comment: "He may have 
been innocently mistaken about the apparel of the robbers, which is 
understandable in the circumstances, given that a gun was pointed at 
him."132 Here the court seems to make an excuse for the fact that there is a 
contradiction by stating that fear might have caused the mistaken 
identification. The research mentioned in Henderson shows that high levels 
of stress and fear are likely to affect the reliability of a witness' identification. 
It has also been shown that high levels of stress can diminish an eyewitness' 
ability to recall and make an accurate identification. How the court could 
                                            
131  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) para 9. 
132  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) para 11. 
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conclude that stress and fear which are known negatively to affect the 
reliability of eyewitness testimony could assist the State's case in respect of 
the identification of the appellant is difficult to comprehend. The court 
conceded that Mbatha may have been innocently mistaken about the 
apparel of the robbers, which it held was understandable in the 
circumstances, given that a gun was pointed at him. 
This is the very problem that leads to mistaken identity. Even if a witness is 
truthful, factors identified in Henderson and other South African case law 
make identification evidence dangerous. In S v Ndika133 Marais JA also 
observed: "It is of course so that the honesty of a witness in identifying a 
person is not by itself a guarantee of its correctness."134  
Case law in South Africa and other jurisdictions following the Anglo-
American tradition has indicated that the real danger with identification 
evidence is that witnesses can make bona fide mistakes. The court's 
reasoning that the identification must be correct because Mbatha had no 
reason to falsely implicate the appellant and accused135 is highly 
problematic. 
3.5.4  Duration 
Despite the fact that Mbatha testified that the robbery lasted close to ten 
minutes, the recording by the CCTV cameras indicated that the entire 
episode lasted only 2 minutes and 10 seconds.136 The Henderson court held 
that identifications based on such a short period and in such chaotic 
circumstances should be regarded with caution, as this could in fact lead to 
misidentification. 
3.5.5 Particularity of prior description 
The SCA acknowledges that the quality of the witness's description of the 
accused is of vital importance. Where it is rich in specifics, it would carry 
more weight than a more generic description. In S v Charzen137 Cameron J 
stated: "[F]acial characteristics are a more reliable and enduring source of 
identification than variable features such as hairstyle or clothing."138 
                                            
133  S v Ndika 2002 1 SACR 250 (SCA). 
134  S v Ndika 2002 1 SACR (SCA) 250G. Also see S v Mathebula 1996 2 SACR 231 (T). 
135  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA) para 12. 
136  S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA). 
137  S v Charzen 2006 2 SACR 143 (SCA). 
138  S v Charzen 2006 2 SACR 143 (SCA) para 14. 
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In casu, the only description given of the two convicted persons is the fact 
that one (the appellant) had very short cut hair and that the other was 
wearing blue Adidas clothing. How the court a quo and especially the SCA 
could have found that these descriptions were sufficient to warrant the 
identification of the accused is problematic. The question arises as to how 
many other people could have had short cut hair and could have worn blue 
Adidas clothes? A bold statement that the accused is the person who 
committed the crime is not adequate. Such a statement, unexplored, 
untested and uninvestigated, leaves the door open for the possibility of 
error.139 
3.5.6 Identification of familiars or strangers 
It was relevant to determine whether the appellant and Mbatha were 
previously acquainted. Identifying a person with whom one is acquainted 
bears a deal of reliability that is absent when identifying a stranger. The 
appellant was a stranger to Mbatha and the identification should have been 
approached with more caution. In S v Ramabokela140 it was pointed out that 
while a dock identification might not carry the same weight as evidence 
arising out of a proper identification parade, it could not be equated to the 
answer to a leading question. The usual cautionary rule has to be applied, 
and the weight of the evidence depends on the circumstances of the 
individual case. In that case the witnesses were found to be honest and 
reliable, and the fact that one of them knew the appellants beforehand would 
have rendered the holding of a formal identification parade valueless. 
3.5.7 A dock identification or in-court identification 
A dock identification or in-court identification assumes that the witness 
correctly observed the accused perpetrating the crime and can reliably 
identify the perpetrator in court. Where the accused has been identified 
independently in a prior procedure, such as in an identification parade, the 
possibility of misidentification is ameliorated to a great extent. In casu this 
was not the case. In fact, the dock identification came in answer to a direct 
question of the State; "Are you in a position or are you able to identify any 
one of them?" A dock identification can be criticized in these two 
complementary respects: not only does it lack the safeguards that are 
offered by an identification parade, but the position of the accused persons 
in the dock positively increases the risk of a wrong identification.  
                                            
139  S v Tandwa 2008 1 SACR 613 (SCA) para 130. 
140  S v Ramabokela 2011 1 SACR 122 (GNP). 
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Paragraph 10 states that: 
merely because Mbatha made a dock identification of the appellant and 
accused 5 does not make his evidence less credible.  
The court refers to S v Tandwa,141 where the SCA held that a dock 
identification carries little weight unless it is shown to be sourced in an 
independent preceding identification. This would for example be where a 
prior identification parade has been held. This was not done. In fact, any 
prior procedure that could vouchsafe for the reliability of the dock 
identification would generally be taken into consideration. When the court in 
casu holds that there is no rule of law that a dock identification must be 
discounted altogether, it merely asserts the law as it stands.142 But when 
the court tries to galvanise the dock identification by stating that the 
evidence should be accurate, because Mbatha had ample opportunity at 
least to observe two of the robbers, this is just factually incorrect. The 
evidence clearly shows that the robbery took two minutes and 10 seconds. 
In this regard the court in S v De Vries143 remarked: 
It is so that an identification parade is not only an accepted investigative 
procedure but also serves an important evidential purpose in that it can 
provide the prosecution with evidence which is of far more persuasive value 
than an identification in court. See in this regard R v Sebeso 1943 AD 196 and 
R v Mputing 1960 (1) SA 785 (T) at 788G.144  
4 Conclusion 
The law, at times, fails to keep pace with developments in science. In 
Henderson the court boldly recognised that the legal standards governing 
the admissibility and use of identification evidence lagged far behind the 
findings of numerous studies in the social sciences.145 The decision reflects 
the growing awareness that the existing standards in State courts and The 
                                            
141  S v Tandwa 2008 1 SACR 613 (SCA). 
142  In S v Tandwa 2008 1 SACR 613 (SCA) it was said by Cameron JA, Mlambo JA and 
Hancke AJA (at [129]): "Dock identification … may be relevant evidence, but generally, 
unless it is shown to be sourced in an independent preceding identification, it carries 
little weight". In this case the dock identification was held reliable for several reasons, 
including the fact that the witness concerned had had prior prolonged exposure to the 
accused and had also paired two of the accused who were shown to have had a close 
association with each other. 
143  S v De Vries (67/2005) [2008] ZAWCHC 36 (10 June 2008). 
144  S v De Vries (67/2005) [2008] ZAWCHC 36 (10 June 2008) para [262]. 
145  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
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Supreme Court in the United States evaluating eyewitness testimony set 
out in Manson v Brathwaite,146 are inconsistent with scientific knowledge.147 
The New Jersey court indicated that revised jury instructions were needed 
to help jurors "both understand and evaluate the effects that various factors 
have on memory",148 noting that jurors "do not intuitively understand all of 
the relevant scientific findings".149 In the light of Mdlongwa this might also 
be said about some judges and magistrates in South Africa. The Henderson 
court concluded that science-based revisions were necessary "because 
eyewitness identifications bear directly on guilt or innocence".150  
The Henderson court is emphatic that  
[h]uman memory is not foolproof. Research has revealed that human memory 
is not like a video recording that a witness needs only to replay to remember 
what happened. Memory is far more complex. The process of remembering 
consists of three stages: acquisition — the perception of the original event; 
retention — the period of time that passes between the event and the eventual 
recollection of a piece of information; and retrieval — the stage during which 
a person recalls stored information. At each of these stages, memory can be 
affected by a variety of factors. 
The main aspects of the complete jury instructions151 on eyewitness 
evidence issued by the New Jersey Supreme Court are that: 
 One, whether the witness was under a high level of stress. Even 
under the best viewing conditions, high levels of stress can reduce 
an eyewitness's ability to recall and make an accurate identification. 
 Two, whether a weapon was used, especially if the crime was of 
short duration. The presence of a weapon can distract the witness 
and take the witness's attention away from the perpetrator's face. As 
a result, the presence of a visible weapon may reduce the reliability 
of the subsequent identification if the crime is of short duration. 
 Three, how much time the witness had to observe the event. 
Although there is no minimum time required to make an accurate 
identification, a brief or fleeting contact is less likely to produce an 
                                            
146  Manson v Brathwaite 432 US 98 (1977). 
147  The more recent decision of the Supreme Court of Oregon S v Lawson 352 Or 724 
(2012) also reflects this point of view. See Perry v New Hampshire 132 S Ct 716, 730 
(2012), discussed below. 
148  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
149  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
150  S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011). 
151  Criminal Practice Committee 2012 http://bit.ly/21KZq7R. 
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accurate identification than a more prolonged exposure to the 
perpetrator. In addition, time estimates given by a witness may not 
always be accurate because witnesses tend to think events lasted 
longer than they actually did.  
 Four, whether the witness possessed characteristics that would 
make it harder to make an identification, such as the age of the 
witness and the influence of drugs or alcohol. An identification made 
by a witness under the influence of a high level of alcohol at the time 
of the incident tends to be more unreliable than an identification by a 
witness who consumed a small amount of alcohol. 
 Five, whether the perpetrator possessed characteristics that would 
make it harder to make an identification. Was he or she wearing a 
disguise? Did the suspect have different facial features at the time of 
the identification The perpetrator's use of a disguise can affect a 
witness's ability both to remember and identify the perpetrator. 
Disguises like hats, sunglasses, or masks can reduce the accuracy 
of an identification. Similarly, if facial features are altered between 
the time of the event and a later identification procedure, the 
accuracy of the identification may decrease. 
 Six, how much time elapsed between the crime and the identification. 
Memories fade with time. The more time that passes, the greater the 
possibility that a witness's memory of a perpetrator will weaken. 
 Seven, whether the case involves cross-racial identification. 
Research has shown that people may have greater difficulty in 
accurately identifying members of a different race. 
 Eight, whether the observation of the perpetrator was close or far. 
The greater the distance between an eyewitness and a perpetrator, 
the higher the risk of a mistaken identification. In addition, a witness's 
estimate of how far he or she was from the perpetrator may not 
always be accurate because people tend to have difficulty estimating 
distances. 
 Nine, whether or not the lighting was adequate during the 
observation. Inadequate lighting can reduce the reliability of an 
identification. 
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 Ten, the confidence of the witness, standing alone, may not be an 
indication of the reliability of the identification. Although some 
research has found that highly confident witnesses are more likely to 
make accurate identifications, eyewitness confidence is generally an 
unreliable indicator of accuracy. Even an identification made in good 
faith could be mistaken. 
In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States in Perry v New 
Hampshire152 side-stepped the issues concerning the appropriateness of 
the outmoded reliability standard153 of eyewitness evidence. The 
opportunity was lost to determine the use of scientifically informed criteria 
appropriately to deal with eyewitness testimony. However, Robert Couch,154 
commenting on the Perry v New Hampshire case, stated that 
Henderson not Perry, is the wave of the future. While Perry remained silent 
on critical issues, Henderson attacked directly – creating a modern framework 
to evaluate eyewitness evidence that is in line with the scientific studies of the 
past thirty-five years. 
The fundamental aim of eyewitness identification evidence is reliably to 
convict the guilty and to protect the innocent. This new wave, introduced by 
S v Henderson, has not gone unnoticed in other State courts in the USA. In 
S v Lawson155 the court gave recognition to all the factors highlighted in 
Henderson. Lawson went further and held that the court should take judicial 
notice of legislative facts of the science of memory. In Massachusetts, the 
Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court convened a study group on 
Eyewitness Evidence.156 The Report inter alia recommends judicial notice 
of modern psychological principles,157 revised jury eyewitness identification 
instructions158 and continuous education of both judges and lawyers.159 
                                            
152  Perry v New Hampshire 132 S Ct 716, 730 (2012). 
153  Couch 2013 Mich L Rev 1535-1548. 
154  Couch 2013 Mich L Rev 1545. 
155  S v Lawson 352 Or 724, 740 (2012). 
156  Supreme Judicial Court Study Group Recommendation 1 at 9. 
157  Supreme Judicial Court Study Group Recommendation 4 at 11 
158  Supreme Judicial Court Study Group Recommendation 4 at 12. 
159  Supreme Judicial Court Study Group Recommendation 4 at 12. National Research 
Council Identifying the Culprit recognises that the federal standard governing the 
admissibility of eyewitness testimony as set forth in the Manson v Braithwaite test 
under the Due Process Clause of the US Constitution was set out in 1977 before much 
of the applied research on eyewitness identification had been conducted, and it 
includes factors that are not diagnostic of reliability. It recommends best practices for 
judges to follow in assessing and using eyewitness testimony, inter alia recommending 
that judges assessing the reliability of an eyewitness identification should determine 
which eyewitness identification procedures the police had in place and the degree to 
which they were followed. The report also emphasis that an eyewitness identification 
should not typically occur for the first time in a courtroom. 
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There is no reason why the scientific principles discussed above should not 
be applicable to South African law. Recognition and education pertaining to 
these factors can and should be incorporated in South Africa. This would 
indeed be science serving justice. 
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